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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050522-CA
v.
ROBERT SHERRY,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute, a first degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pourover provision).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the prosecutor's brief reference to suppression issues during
closing argument warrant a mistrial where curative instructions and
strong evidence of defendant's guilt rendered the reference harmless?
'"Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact
on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion
based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Pritchett,
2003 UT 24, K 10, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah
1998)).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was originally charged by information with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a first degree felony; possession of
methamphetamine, a first degree felony; possession of marijuana, a third degree felony;
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; driving without insurance, a
class B misdemeanor; and driving on a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor (R2-4).
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over on all of the possession charges
(R25).
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle and
evidence found in a subsequent search of his home (R67-72,92-94). The State opposed
defendant's motion (R78-87). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied
defendant's motion as to evidence found in his vehicle but granted his motion as to
evidence found in his residence (Rl 00-01,105-07).
Based on the trial court's ruling, the State filed an amended information charging
defendant with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a first degree
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor (R122-23). A jury
trial followed. Defendant moved for a mistrial after closing argument, alleging
prosecutorial misconduct in the State's closing argument (R204:183). After the trial court
2

denied defendant's motion, the jury convicted defendant as charged (R124-28,17172,192-95; R204:189). Defendant was sentenced to five-years-to-life in prison on his
first degree felony conviction; his sentence on his misdemeanor conviction was stayed
(R192-95).
Defendant timely appealed (Rl87-88). The supreme court transferred the matter to
this Court for disposition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence. On June 25, 2004, a police officer stopped the truck defendant was
driving because it lacked a license plate (R204:59-60). When approached by the officer,
defendant acknowledged that the unregistered truck was his and that he did not have a
driver's license (R204:61). A subsequent record check confirmed that defendant's
driver's license had been suspended (R240:61). The check provided no information on
the registration of the vehicle (R240:61).
Based on the registration and license violations, defendant was arrested and his
vehicle searched in preparation for its impound (R204:62,68). The search revealed an
uncovered speaker hole in the driver's door (R204:68). Inside the hole, in a cloth bag,
were 51 grams of fresh methamphetamine, a scale, and several small plastic baggies
(R204:68,70-71). Although the truck was "filthy dirty," the cloth bag showed no signs of
accumulated dirt or dust (R204:72,74,125,146).
Sergeant Keith Millett, who leads the Iron/Garfield County Narcotics Task Force,
testified that 51 grams of methamphetamine has a street value of over $5,000
3

(R204:90,93). "[I]t's very valuable to a person that's dealing—dealing the substance.
It's like cash. They're gonna actually keep it close b[y].. .. They're not gonna arbitrarily
leave it out for someone else to pick up or lose or be taken" (R204:96).
In his defense, defendant called one witness, a self-employed auto mechanic and
close family friend named Nelson S. Gallaagr (R204:131,133,145). Gallaagr testified
that, about two weeks before defendant's arrest, defendant asked him to work on
defendant's truck, a Chevy pickup that was not running (R204:133). At the time, the
truck sat unlocked in a parking lot owned by a small local company named Agrinautics
(R204:134). Gallaagr thought about 12 people worked at the company (R204:134).
However, the parking lot was next to Airport Road, which got a lot of traffic (R204:136).
Gallaagr could tell that the truck had been sitting in the lot "for a year or two"
because the engine "was all fuzzy just from the dirt, just from the desert and all that stuff
and because "rats had a nest in the air breather" (R204:135). Gallaagr and defendant used
a forklift to pull out the engine. They took the engine to Gallaagr's shop, where he
worked on it for about a week and a half (R204:135,137,144).
After Gallaagr rebuilt the engine, he and defendant put it back into the truck
(R204:138). Defendant drove the truck away that day (R204:138). Defendant returned
the next day because the truck "did not have power breaks" and because "the carburetor
wasn't workin' right because it set so long" (R204:138). Defendant left again after those
repairs were done (R204:138). He was arrested about an hour later (R204:138).
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Gallaagr did not know how the truck ended up in the Agrinautics parking lot or
how defendant had come to own it (R204:140,146). He had been in the truck while
working on it (R204:141). He never saw any drugs in the door (R204:142). "All [he]
saw was a filthy dirty truck" (R204:146). Gallaagr stated, however, that he "never had a
reason to even look in the door" (R204:142). He explained that his "main part was under
the hood" (R204:142). Gallaagr did not put the drugs in the car door, nor were the drugs
his(R204:143).
Neither the bag nor its contents were analyzed for fingerprints (R204:86-87).
Opening statements. In his opening statement, the prosecutor summarized the
evidence he planned to present. The prosecutor stated that the evidence would show that
defendant was arrested after having been stopped by police for driving in an unregistered
truck. A subsequent search of the truck revealed a large quantity of methamphetamine in
a hole in the driver's side door, together with a small scale and small baggies. Defendant
was the driver and sole occupant of the truck at the time (R204:52-54).
In his opening statement, defense counsel acknowledged that drugs had been
found in the vehicle he had been driving. Counsel asserted, however, that "[t]he problem
is that.. . the State has the burden of establishing a nexus between, ah, Mr. Sherry and
the drugs" (R204:55). Counsel asserted that the State would not be able to meet that
burden where "the truck wasn't registered," "[i]t hadn't ran for years," and "it's been
parked out in—in a business for years" (R205:55). Moreover, "there's no—no indication
of fingerprints or any other sort of type of evidence that would indicate that [defendant]
5

. . . had knowledge about these in these drugs" (R204:57). Rather, "the evidence is going
to indicate that Mr. Sherry had no idea the[ drugs] were in there" (R204:56).
Closing argument.1 In closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed the elements
instructions for the two crimes as they related to the evidence (R204:154-58). He then
addressed the reasonable doubt instruction and whether reasonable doubt had been raised
in this case (R204:158-62). The prosecutor noted that, although he presented no
fingerprint evidence, "[w]e have had a little talk about fingerprints and why the law
enforcement didn't get fingerprints" (R204:160). The prosecutor also noted evidence
"that the truck was dirty—very dirty inside" and "[y]et this bag, which . . . is in
substantially the same condition it was in at the time it was taken from the truck . . . looks
pretty clean" (R204:161). Thus, "this evidence hadn't sat in that truck, you know, for a
long extended period of time" (R204:161).
In his closing, defense counsel focused on his contention that the evidence raised a
reasonable doubt concerning whether defendant had possessed the drugs and
paraphernalia found in his truck. Counsel noted that the truck wasn't registered at the
time police stopped it; it hadn't been insured since 1999; it hadn't been running for a long
time; it had sat for at least some period of time in a company parking lot; it had not been
locked because there was no key to unlock it; it was then worked on by a mechanic for
some two weeks; shortly after defendant drove it away, he returned it for more repairs;
and defendant was arrested shortly after retrieving the truck once those repairs were
]

The transcript of closing arguments is attached at Addendum A.
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completed (R204:169-70). Counsel then focused on the lack of fingerprint evidence
(R204:172). He concluded that, "when you have a situation like we have here," where
"the State has not established in any manner exclusive control" by defendant and where
"we don't have any fingerprints to prove or establish that he touched this or ever had
control of it, I don't think the State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" (R204:174-75).
In his rebuttal, the prosecutor addressed the various arguments defendant had
presented (R204:175-80). The prosecutor then referred to the suppression hearing that
had taken place before trial (R204:180): "Sometimes juries get—they get caught up in,
ah, suppression issues and things like that when they get back to deliberate. I just want to
tell you that—that those issues, ah, have already been resolved in this case. In other
words—"(R204:180-81).
Defendant objected to the prosecutor's comment as "inappropriate" (R204:181).
The trial court agreed, stating that "[t]here's no evidence in the record regarding that the
jury can consider" (R204:181). The prosecutor explained his comment:
Okay. My point is that when you get back to deliberate, ah,
you're not to consider search and seizure issues or whether or not the
search was lawful that was performed by Detective Gower. That
your law, as it's contained in those instructions, 1 through 24, that's
where you're to find your law and your instructions. And anything
outside of that, ah, is not to be considered by—by the jury, together
in your deliberations. That is where your law is contained.
(R204:181). Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's explanation (R204:181).
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After once more directing the jury "to your jury instructions" to answer any
"questions about anything, you know, regarding this case, as far as the law goes," the
prosecutor concluded by asking the jury to convict defendant on both charges (R204:18182).
Jury instructions,2 After closing argument, the jury received its final instructions.
Instruction 2 directed the jury that "[y]ou are to be governed in this case by the evidence
presented to you and the law as I state it to you," and that "[y]ou may not consider .. .
guesswork . . . in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant" (Rl 69; Jury Inst. 2).
Instruction 3 instructed the jury that they "may not consider evidence which is
excluded" or "consider as evidence statements of the attorneys" (R168; Jury. Inst. 3). The
same instruction then reiterated that counsels' statements were not to be considered
evidence:
Statements, arguments and remarks of the attorneys are
intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law, but
such statements are not evidence. You should disregard any
statement of any attorney which has no basis in the evidence coming
from witnesses, documents or stipulations received in evidence in
this case.
(R168; Jury Inst. 3).
Defendant's mistrial motion.3 After the jury was excused to deliberate,
defendant moved for a mistrial (R204:183). Defendant argued that the prosecutor's
2

Copies of instructions 2 and 3 are attached at Addendum B.

3

The transcript of argument on defendant's mistrial motion is attached at
Addendum C.
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reference to suppression issues in rebuttal was "prosecutorial misconduct" because "[i]t
has nothing to do with any defense that we presented and does nothing more than try and
tell the jury that there's evidence out there that he wasn't able to present" (R204:183).
The trial court denied defendant's motion:
I didn't hear anything in the comment that would have
inferred to the jury that there was other evidence that they weren't
told about. Ah, so I don't view that as the purpose of the statement.
On the other hand[,] I don't think that's appropriate for the
prosecutor [to] tell the jury about prior proceedings that aren't in
the—aren't in the evidence. And, so I find that I think that it was
inappropriate to make that comment that those issues had already
been dealt with. On the other hand, I don't think it rises to the level
that requires a mistrial, so I'm gonna deny the motion for a mistrial.
(R204:189).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his mistrial
motion. Defendant claims that a mistrial was warranted because the prosecutor's
reference to "suppression issues" during closing argument implied that other evidence
existed to support defendant's guilt. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show both that the
prosecutor improperly referred the jury to matters not proper for its consideration and that
the comments significantly influenced the jury's verdict.
Here, even assuming that the prosecutor's comment was improper, defendant
cannot show that he was prejudiced by it. First, in context, the prosecutor's comment did
not imply that other evidence of defendant's guilt existed. Second, the jury received
9

numerous curative instructions following the prosecutor's comment. Third, the evidence
against defendant was strong.
ARGUMENT
THE PROSECUTOR'S BRIEF REFERENCE TO SUPPRESSION
ISSUES DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT DID NOT WARRANT A
MISTRIAL WHERE CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND STRONG
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S GUILT RENDERED THE
REFERENCE HARMLESS
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a mistrial. Defendant claims that "[t]he prosecutor's inappropriate statements
[addressing suppression issues] tainted the trial with the information that there existed
other incriminating evidence which had been suppressed and thus which the jury was not
allowed to hear, thus depriving the Defendant of his right to a fair trial" Aplt. Br. at 5.
Defendant's claim fails where he was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments, even
if those comments were improper.
'"Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact
on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial motion
based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Pritchett,
2003 UT 24, Tj 10, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 (Utah
1998). "'This standard is met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more
favorable result for the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276) (additional
citations and quotation marks omitted).
10

I.

General law governing prosecutorial misconduct claims.

To establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show that "'the
prosecutor's comments call[ed] the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their
consideration and [that] the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the
jury by significantly influencing its verdict.'" State v. Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68, f 15, 21
P.3d 1142 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, % 18, 8 P.3d 1025) (additional citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). '"In determining
whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be
viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.'" State v. Longshaw, 961
P.2d 925, 927 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah
App. 1992)).
Against that backdrop, the law is well-established that a prosecutor may not refer
to previously excluded evidence during closing argument. See, e.g., People v. Crew, 74
P.3d 820, 839 (Cal. 2003) (holding that it is improper "for a prosecutor to make remarks
in . . . closing arguments that refer to evidence determined to be inadmissible in a
previous ruling of the trial court"), cert, denied, 541 U.S. 991 (2004); People v. Mullen,
566 N.E.2d 222, 227 (111. 1990) (holding that "it is improper to refer to evidence which
has been excluded" during closing argument); Pure v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn.
2004) (holding that prosecutor's reference in closing argument to evidence ruled
inadmissible was improper); State v. Williams, 119 S.W.3d 674, 680 (Mo. App. 2003)
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(holding that prosecutor commits error by commenting on or referring to excluded
evidence).
The law is also well-established that a prosecutor may not use a defendant's
invocation of his constitutional rights against him during closing argument. See, e.g.,
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah 1998) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619
(1976), for proposition that "use of post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes
violates Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment").
However, a prosecutor's brief reference to a defendant's invocation of his
constitutional rights does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct unless the State, "in
some way, use[s] the defendant's [invocation] to undermine the exercise of those rights."
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268. In other words, a new trial is warranted only "[i]f the error is
substantial and prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that it
affected the reliability of the trial outcome." Id. This rule also attains when the
prosecutor only briefly references suppression matters. See, e.g., People v. Chavez, 762
N.E.2d 553, 564 (111. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that prosecutor's improper comment on
suppressed evidence in closing argument was harmless where evidence of guilt was
overwhelming), appeal den., 770 N.E.2d 221 (111. 2002); People v. Stein, 366 N.E.2d 629,
636 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that two references to suppression motion during
questioning of witness were not prejudicial where prosecutor did not "specifically state[]
to what the motion to suppress referred [or] specifically [tell] the jury that the court had
denied defendant's motion to suppress"); People v. Smith, 350 N.E.2d 791, 793 (111. App.
12

Ct. 1976) (finding no prejudice where, after prosecutor mentioned suppression hearing
during cross-examination of defendant, trial court sustained defendant's objection); State
v. McNeil, 658 N.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that prosecutor's
misconduct in eliciting suppressed evidence on multiple occasions was harmless where
evidence of guilt was overwhelming); People v. Rivera, 530 N.Y.S.2d 269, 269 (App.
Div. 1988) (holding that prosecutor's improper comment on suppressed evidence was
harmless where "any possible prejudice . . . was cured by the court's prompt curative
instruction and jury charge, which informed the jury that statements of the attorneys did
not constitute evidence"); United States v. Grubbs, 776 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 & n.4 (5th Cir.
1985) (holding that prosecutor's improper comment on suppression hearing and
suppressed evidence was "unlikely" to lead jury "astray" and thus "did not have the
requisite detrimental effect on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly" to rise to
level of plain error) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).4
Finally, this Court need not decide whether a prosecutor's comments were
improper if defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by them. See State v. Adams,

4

Citing State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995), defendant asks this
Court to require a showing that the prosecutor's comment was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt before this Court upholds the trial court's mistrial ruling. See Aplt. Br.
at 4. Genovesi, however, involved "the admission of evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment" to prove the defendant's guilt. Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 922. This case
does not involve the admission of excluded evidence. Thus, the constitutional
harmlessness analysis does not apply. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 269 (applying general
harmlessness analysis to prosecutor's inadvertent reference to defendant's invocation of
right to silence).
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955 P.2d 7815 786 (Utah App. 1998) ("We do not address whether the prosecutor's
comments constituted error because we find no evidence of prejudice."), affd, 2002 UT
42, 5 P.3d 642.
II.

Analysis

Here, the trial court deemed the prosecutor's statement improper. Assuming, but
not conceding the correctness of that ruling, defendant has not shown that he was
prejudiced by it. See Adams, 955 P.2d at 786.
First, the prosecutor's comment did not "specifically state[] to what the motion to
suppress referred [or] specifically [tell] the jury that the court had denied defendant's
motion to suppress." Stein, 366 N.E.2d at 636 (holding that two references to suppression
motion during questioning of witness were not prejudicial where prosecutor's reference to
suppression motion was inadvertent). Indeed, it was so vague as to not tell the jury much
of anything.
Moreover, in explaining his comment, the prosecutor directed the jury's attention
away from any inference that additional evidence existed when he specifically asked the
jury not to consider the legality of the search of defendant's car (R204:181 (directing the
jury not to consider "whether or not the search was lawful that was performed by
Detective Gower")). By explaining that his comment concerned the jury's possible
consideration of the legality of that search, the prosecutor dispelled any inference that his
comment referred to any other search or evidence.

14

Thus, the trial court correctly found that nothing "in the comment... would have
[implied] to the jury that there was other evidence that they weren't told about"
(R204:183). See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268 (holding that brief reference to a defendant's
invocation of right to silence does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct unless the
State, "in some way, use[s] the defendant's [invocation] to undermine the exercise of
those rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment").
Second, although the trial court did not give an immediate curative instruction
after sustaining defendant's objection, the prosecutor essentially did when, without
objection, he explained to the jury that his point was only "that when you get back to
deliberate,... you're not to consider search and seizure issues," that the governing law
was "your instructions," and that "anything outside of that, ah, is not to be considered"
(R204:181-82).
The jury received additional curative instructions in its general jury instructions.
Instruction 2 directed the jury that "[y]ou are to be governed in this case by the evidence
presented to you and the law as I state it to you," and that "[y]ou may not consider . . .
guesswork . . . in deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant" (R169; Jury Inst. 2).
Instruction 3 instructed the jury both that they "may not consider evidence which is
excluded" and that "you may not consider as evidence statements of the attorneys" (R168;
Jury. Inst. 3). The same instruction then reiterated that counsels' statements were not to
be considered evidence:

15

Statements, arguments and remarks of the attorneys are
intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law, but
such statements are not evidence. You should disregard any
statement of any attorney which has no basis in the evidence coming
from witnesses, documents or stipulations received in evidence in
this case.
(R168; Jury Inst. 3). See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, % 24, 999 P.2d 7 (rejecting
prosecutorial misconduct claim where trial court gave immediate curative instruction and
then additional curative instruction in overall jury instructions, concluding that
"[djefendant has not shown, as is his burden, that the comment was so prejudicial as to
defeat the mitigating effect of the court's two curative instructions"); see also Longshaw,
961 P.2d at 929-30 (holding that instruction directing jury to be governed by jury
instructions was sufficient to cure prosecutor's misstatement of law in closing argument;
citing cases). Cf. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 271 (noting that "curative instructions are a settled
and necessary feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by
which a court may remedy errors at trial").
Finally, the evidence against defendant was strong. Fifty-one grams of
methamphetamine was found in a dirt-free bag in a hole in the driver's door of a very
dirty truck in which defendant, the driver and owner, was the sole occupant
(R204:61,68,70-72,74,93,125). The meth had a street value of over $5,000 (R204:93). It
was therefore "very valuable to a person that's . .. dealing the substance" and something
its owner was "gonna actually keep .. . close b[y]" (R204:96). Where "the evidence of
[defendant's] guilt was strong," this Court "will not presume the prosecutor's [comments]
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were prejudicial, especially in light of the [subsequent] curative admonition to the jury."
Longshaw, 961 P.2d at 931; see also State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah App. 1998)
(rejecting prosecutorial misconduct claim where, "even if there was error," "the evidence
against defendant. .. was considerable"; citing cases).
In sum, given the limited nature of the prosecutor's reference, the curative
instructions that followed, and the strength of the evidence establishing defendant's guilt,
defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's comment, even if that comment was
improper. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying defendant's mistrial motion.
Defendant's cases do not alter that result. Both State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916,
920-21 (Utah App. 1995), and Walton v. State, 431 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Ark. 1968), see
Aplt. Br. at 4, 7, involve the trial court's erroneous denial of a defendant's motion to
suppress evidence that was then admitted at trial. In both cases, therefore, the
determinative issue was whether the defendant was prejudiced by the jury's knowledge of
specific evidence that should have been suppressed. See Genovesi, 909 P.2d at 921-22;
Walton, 431 S.W.2d at 467. By contrast, in this case, the prosecutor never identified the
evidence that was the subject of defendant's suppression motion, let alone presented that
evidence to the jury (R204:180-81). Thus, Genovesi and Walton are inapposite.
Along the same line, Robinson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 534, 535-36 (Ark. App. 1981),
involved the prosecutor's reference to specific evidence that had been suppressed before
trial. See Aplt. Br. at 4, 7. State v. Movant, 574 A.2d 502, 510 (NJ. Super. App. Div.
1990), involved the use of suppressed evidence by one co-defendant against another. See
17

Aplt. Br. at 6. As in Genovesi and Walton, the issue in those cases was whether the
defendant was prejudiced by the reference to or use of specific evidence that should have
been excluded. See Robinson, 623 S.W.2d at 536; Movant, 51A A.2d at 510. Because the
prosecutor here never identified the evidence suppressed by defendant's motion,
Robinson and Movant, like Genovesi and Walton, are distinguishable.
Nelson v. State, 513 S.W.2d 496 (Ark. 1974), does not address inadmissible
evidence improperly referenced at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 4, 7. Thus, Nelson does not
involve any of the issues raised by defendant's brief. Nelson, 513 S.W.2d at 498-501.5
The most applicable case cited by defendant is State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262
(Utah 1998). [n that case, Harmon challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for
mistrial after the prosecutor inadvertently elicited suppressed evidence that defendant had
invoked his right to silence. Id. at 266-67. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
ruling where the State's eliciting the evidence was inadvertent and the State had not "in
some way, use[d] the defendant's silence to undermine the exercise of those rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 268. Given that "the fact of Harmon's
post-arrest silence was not submitted to the jury as evidence from which it was allowed to
draw any permissible inference," the court held, "the elicited statement was not
prejudicial." Id. at 269.

5

Although Nelson is cited in Robinson, it appears to be cited only for the
unremarkable proposition that prejudicial errors require reversal. See Robinson, 623
S.W.2d at 536, Nelson, 513 S.W.2d at 499.
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Here, as in Harmon, the prosecutor's reference to the pre-trial suppression hearing
was harmless. As previously discussed, the prosecutor never attempted to, "in some way,
use the defendant's [filing of a suppression motion] to undermine the exercise of those
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268. Indeed, the
comment was so cryptic as to not convey much of anything to the jury. Moreover, the
prosecutor's comment was followed by a curative explanation and curative instructions,
and the evidence against defendant was strong. Under such circumstances, the
prosecutor's comment did not "'so likely influence[] the jury that the defendant cannot be
said to have had a fair trial.'" Id. at 274-75 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,
1231 (Utah 1997)).
Consequently, even if the prosecutor's comment were error, the trial court did not
err in denying defendant's mistrial motion.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED So_ January 2006.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNpC
Assistant Attorney General
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(Court read Instructions No. 8 through and
Including NO. 24, and verdict forms.)
THE COURT:
which I just spoke.
(Indicated).

In my hand I hold the Verdict Form of
There's the caption of this case

It has the two counts listed and the two choices

of verdict as to each count, guilty or not guilty.
On the second page there is a date for -- and a
signature line for the Foreperson of the jury to execute so
that any verdict set out on this form is certified to be the
unanimous verdict of the jury.
concurring jurors.

Below that there are lines for

All those who agree with the verdict

recorded on the form should sign as a concurring juror.

That

means that the Foreperson, assuming he or she agrees with the
verdict, would also sign and there would be eight signatures
there as concurring jurors.
The verdict is simply indicated by placing an X or a
check above the appropriate "yes".

One of those marks as to

each count.
Okay.

Ready for closing arguments.

Mr. Garrett.
PLAINTIFF'S INITIAL CLOSING ARGUMENT
BY MR. GARRETT:
members of the jury.

May it please the Court, counsel,

Just want to start off, ah, by thanking

you again for your time and your service.
clarify one thing.

I also want to

Ah, in a criminal trial like this,

although the attorneys do a lot of talking, we don't actually,
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ah, present, ah, or give evidence that goes on the record.
The evidence was presented by the witnesses, by Commander
Millett and by Agent Gower and Officer Ball.
evidence that —

That's the

that you're going to consider.

The things that I say is not evidence.

I, myself,

and Mr. Slavens, we're here to help the proceedings go along
to present witnesses, ah, to ask questions, ah, to -- to help
introduce the evidence into evidence, but we don't actually —
the things that we say is not evidence.

Okay.

The evidence

came from the witnesses and this that is marked (Indicated)
which you'll have a chance to take back in the Jury Room with
you.

That's the evidence that you're gonna consider today.
Now this is the chance for me to get up and tell

what you about what I think about the law that you've been
given, the Jury Instructions.

And it's also a chance for me

to comment on the evidence and the way that I see it. Mr.
Slavens will have the same opportunity.
When I first started out, I told you that this case
wasn't factually a difficult case, and it's not.

Ah, it's a

stop of a vehicle, a search of the vehicle, and then find
drugs.

That's the case.

Factually, pretty -- pretty slick.

I mean there wasn't a lot of witnesses today that testified.
I had three and the defense had one.
of evidence that you'll consider.
not really a difficult case.

And there's seven items

So -- so factually, not —

I think what it's gonna come
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down to for you jurors, when you get back in deliberation, ah,
is you're gonna apply the -- the facts that you have to the
law as it!s been given to you, and you1re gonna reach a
reasonable conclusion.
ThatTs what —
about is the law.

that's what I want to talk to you

I have, ah, selected two instructions I'd

like you to pay close attention to.
attention to all of them.

You need to pay close

But there's two that are the

elements of the crimes.
Instruction No. 10 is the elements for Unlawful
Possession Of Methamphetamine With Intent To Distribute.

And

Instruction No. 11 is Unlawful Possession Of Drug
Paraphernalia.

And in order to you to convict this defendant

here today, you have to find that the State -- that I have
presented enough evidence through my witnesses to meet each
and every element of the crime.
And so let's just look at jury Instruction No. 10.
Ah, it's the -- it's the instruction for Possession With
Intent To Distribute.

It states that the State must prove and

you must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt each
and every one of the following elements.
No. 1.
intentionally.

That the defendant acted knowingly and

Okay.

You have, also as part of your jury instructions -I believe it's No. 12 —

is your definitions.

You need to
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know your definitions.

To —

to, ah, read the definition on

what knowingly is and what intentionally is.
Someone who acts knowingly and intentionally, it!s
their purpose to do what they did.

In other words, it would

be his purpose to possess the drugs.

Okay?

That would be

acting knowingly and intentionally.
Element No. 2.

That the defendant did possess the

controlled substance methamphetamine.

Here you have — you

have, ah, the STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 2, which is methamphetamine
(Indicated).

It was tested by the Crime Lab.

methamphetamine.

And you'll have back there with you, too,

Mr. Gerlits's report, which —
drugs.

51 grams of

he's the one that tested the

That's his signature here.

And he states that in this

package there is 51 grams of methamphetamine.

Methamphetamine

is a controlled substance and your jury instructions instruct
you on that.
So you're gonna look at No. 2.

Did the defendant

possess the controlled substance, methamphetamine?

And if you

found that we have met our burden in proving that he
possessed, knowingly and intentionally, methamphetamine, you
can just check those off and move on down to No. 3, that the
defendant possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to
distribute the same.

That's the -- that's the next element

you've got to prove.

Did he intend to possess this with the

intent for distribute (Indicated)?

And the evidence that you
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have on that element, if you111 recall, Officer Millett
testified that —

that these (Indicated) —

first of all, the

quantity is substantial enough that itfs a distributable
amount.

Anybody who has 51 grams, over $5,000 worth of

methamphetamine, that's more than what they would normally use
for personal consumption.

So he indicated, from his

experience, that that's a distributable amount.

Along with

that he also indicated these baggies in here are used to
package the controlled substance methamphetamine (Indicated).
In his training and experience, it's very probable
for him to see a larger quantity separated into smaller
quantities, packaged, and then distributed that way.
So you have these little baggies in here (Indicated)
and then you have these -- the scales (Indicated).

And the

scales, as was testified by both Commander Millett and Officer
Gower, are used to weigh out the methamphetamine, and then -and then place it into the baggies.
From that evidence you could —

you could reasonably

conclude that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine with
the intent to distribute.
Ah, kind of interesting when Officer Millett stated
that this was like cash to people that use drugs (Indicated).
Ah, this is cash.

$5,000 right there.

because you wouldn't —

And it's interesting,

looking at this, you wouldn't think

that would be $5,000 worth.

It kind of looks like little
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white crystals.

Rock-type crystals. And you know, you

wouldn't think that would be worth $5,000.

But according to

him, who -- he's been in this investigation of narcotics for a
long time.

Ah, he -- he knows what that substance sells for.

$5,000.
So if you find that we've met that element, you can
check it off and go on to No. 4.

The fourth —

the fourth

element here is that these acts occurred on or about June
25

, 2004, Iron County.

You've heard evidence that Officer

Ball pulled the defendant's vehicle over near the Crystal Inn
on June 25

, 2004, in Cedar City, which is in Iron County,

State of Utah.

That's not disputed.

And so that's —

that's the first charge. Okay.

And if you can check off those —
then -- then —

those four elements there,

then you're saying the State has met its

burden, and you can convict the defendant of Unlawful
Possession Of Methamphetamine With Intent To Distribute.
The second charge is No. 11. You go through the
same process.

Okay?

Did the defendant act knowingly and intentionally,
No. 1?

No.

2.

Did the defendant possess drug paraphernalia?

And, ah, No. 3 kind of gives a —
paraphernalia.

a description of

The said drug paraphernalia was used to

compound, convert, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce
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a controlled substance into the human body.

I certainly think

you can infer, from the evidence that you'll be looking at
that -- and I think the paraphernalia —

the scale certainly

is paraphernalia used to weigh out the product.

And then the

little baggies used to package the methamphetamine.
And then No. 4.
or about June 25
that.

, 2004.

That these acts occurred on —

on

And again you can look through

But if you can check those all off, ah, then you —

you

can find the State, ah, met its burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.

And you should convict the defendant on

both counts.
If —

if you can't find that we've proved each one

of those -- each and every one of those elements, then —
you would have to dismiss the —

then

that particular count, if you

find the State didn't meet its burden.
It is the State's burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, and I want to talk to you a little bit about
reasonable doubt.

Instruction No. 8 refers to that. And

right there on the last paragraph it says proof beyond a
reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and
obviates all reasonable doubt.

So it's that degree of proof

which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding.
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A reasonable group of people here.
you.

Eight jurors who will go back and —

experience, your knowledge —
understanding.

There's eight of

and use your

your experience, your

And together you're gonna talk about — about

these facts and you're gonna —

you're gonna reach a unanimous

conclusion.
And I would just ask you to look at the facts and
ask, "Does it make sense?

Does it —

does it sound right what

the State is alleging here?"
Ah, I think, you know, based on the facts that have
been presented to you, ah, the defendant owned the truck in
question.

That's the evidence that you have in front of you.

There's nothing to contradict that.

This was the defendant's

truck.
Ah, these drugs were found inside this
(Indicated).

bag

I think it's reasonable to believe that the

defendant would try and conceal an illegal item from the
public view.

I don't find it hard to believe at all that the

drugs were hidden back in this compartment (Indicated).

If

you have something that is of this much value and is this
illegal, you're gonna try and conceal it from law enforcement
or from other people that may turn you in.
Of course, they're gonna consume it.

They'll put it

somewhere where it's not easy for other people to see.
Captain Millett testified again about how this is
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like cash to those, ah —

those that deal in drugs

(Indicated).
Who, in their right mind —

and would any of you

leave $5,000 somewhere unattended or not know where it —
where it was?
Would you just leave $5,000 somewhere?
probably not.
mine to me.

That's a lot of money to you.

You know,

It's a lot of

It's a lot of money to anybody.

I would know where my —

where my money was, if it

was $5,000, and I wouldn't leave it in a place, ah, where I
didn't know I could leave it there or unattended.
Ah, he testified that —

that people that are

involved in the drug trade, they like to keep the drug close
to 'em; know where it is. Around their person.

Well, how

much closer can you get than where it was from the defendant?
It was right next to him.

He was driving the truck.

Got his

drugs hidden there in the compartment where nobody can see
'em.

He knows where it's at.

$5,000.

You know, he knew.

He

knew the drugs were there and he knew they were his and he
knew what he was doing.
We have had a little talk about fingerprints and why
the law enforcement didn't get fingerprints.

Well, maybe the

perfect world, you know, all the evidence would be there
and -- and they would be able to draw fingerprints off of
every little -- little item.

Unfortunately we don't live in
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the world of —

of the CSI television shows that you see.

Commander Millett testified it!s oftentimes difficult to pull
fingerprints.

There's many cases that hefs worked where he

hasnTt been able to get prints.

And there!s more than a

couple of cases, of the hundreds, where he had prints that —
that actually solved the case.
You know, itfs pretty strong evidence that — that
it was his truck.

The drugs were right next to him, right

there in his truck.
possession.

That's possession.

To me that's

I don't -- I don't see how you can argue anything

else.
Ah, they were in his possession in his truck.
a lot of money.
them.

He knew they were there.

It's

He was protecting

He had them hidden away.
You heard testimony from their witness that the

truck was dirty -- very dirty inside.

Yet this bag, which

Officer Gower testified is in substantially the same condition
it was in at the time it was taken from the truck.

It looks

pretty clean to me, as well as the scales and the baggies that
are in there.
Ah, it hadn't sat there.

This -- this evidence

hadn't sat in that truck, you know, for a long extended period
of time.
truck.

Ah, it was -- it was being taken in and out of the

I would say, based on the cleanness of the bag and the

cleanness of the scales, you know, it just didn't sit there
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for a long time.

I mean it wasn't like somebody left these

drugs in there and then forgot about it.

Based on the

evidence that I see, reasonable to infer that somebody was
taking those drugs in and out of that compartment.

And who

was in a better position to do that than the owner of the
vehicle?
And so, you know, you'll get the chance to go back
and sift through all this evidence and —

and read your jury

instructions and talk about it amongst yourselves, and, ah,
find a way to reach a conclusion.
I told you at the beginning of -- of the trial that
I was gonna come back and ask you to convict the defendant,
and I'm going to.
unlawful —

I'm gonna ask you to convict him of

of Possession Of methamphetamine With Intent To

Distribute, and Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia, because he
did, in fact, possess —

knowingly and intentionally possess

methamphetamine, and a whole bunch of methamphetamine
(Indicated) with the intent to distribute.

And along with

that methamphetamine, as there always is, ah, there's drug
paraphernalia.

And so we're gonna ask you to convict him of

these two crimes.
Now I'm gonna sit down.

Mr. Slavens is gonna have a

chance to get up and address you for a little bit.
the burden, as I told you, is mine.

Of course,

And so what that means is

after he's done, I'll have a chance to get up and talk a
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little bit more.

Maybe rebut anything that he may say or that

he may bring up a point that I need to address in my closing.
Ah, that's how the system works.

The prosecution gets a

chance to rebut what the defense says, because we have the
burden of proof.

And so I appreciate your time and, ah, Ifll

say a little bit more when Mr. Slavens is done.
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Garrett.

Mr. Slavens.
MR. SLAVENS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

DEFENSE CLOSING ARGUMENT
BY MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

This turns, doesnft it (Indicated)?

Yeah.

the floor cords, so you canft
MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

But it's nailed —

it!s hooked to

—

Except —

except for Ifve read it.

Okay.

MR. SLAVENS:

All right.

Ah, on -- on behalf of Bob, I!d like to, ah, thank
you folks for taking the time out of your day today to come up
and listen to the evidence that's been presented today.
Ah, the Constitution Is a great thing that we have,
and you've been a part of that process today, the
constitution.
ah —

And it promises each and every person that,

that when somebody is accused of a certain —

of certain

crimes and offenses, they have the right to confront their
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witnesses and cross examine the witnesses the State presents.
They have a right to call witnesses on their own behalf and
have somebody from their peers come hear the evidence to see
if they, ah, can reach a -- a verdict, ah, between them —
amongst themselves as to whether or not the State has met its
burden of proof proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and we
appreciate you taking that time and doing that.
I —

I have noticed you.

You've been very attentive

ah, listeners to the evidence that's been presented.

I think

you will, ah, take this charge that you've, ah, entered into
today seriously and —

and review the evidence and see if the

State's met its burden.
As counsel's indicated to you, this is the only time
I get to talk to you about the evidence and the application of
the evidence to the law.
you again.
you know.

He'll be able to get up and talk to

And then I won't be able to say, "Well, but wait,"
"Do you remember this?

Or do you remember that?"

I won't be able to say that again.
that on my behalf, if you would.

So I'm gonna ask you to do

Cause, ah, when —

when, ah,

counsel does, ah, dispute or challenge, ah, the positions that
we're taking in this case, I ask you to say, "Well what would
be the defense response to that and —

and should we make that

application, ah, on the rebuttal to what Mr. Garrett said?"
Ah, because I won't have that opportunity to do that again.
I think it's important, ah, to understand the law
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and how to interpret the law in order to come to a fair
verdict in this.

And —

and the very initial thing that the

Judge told you about it!s important that you not be biased,
ah, by the fact that, ah, Mr., ah -- or that Bob has been
arrested or charged.
of that fact.

There's absolutely no —

no bias because

It -- it -- because of the presumption of

innocence, because of the burden of proof, you can't — you
can't use that against him or to use that as any weight on
what the verdict should be is the fact that he's been arrested
and charged.
Ah, it's got to be completely based upon the
evidence that's been, ah, presented today.

It can't be based

upon sentiment, guesswork, passion, prejudice, any of those
things.

It has —

or, you know, some, ah, negative feelings

you may have about drug use, in particular, or the fact that
you think there was people that are getting away with it or
anything.

None of those things can play a factor on what, ah,

verdict that you folks enter.

It has to be based upon the

evidence and based upon whether or not you feel the State has
met its burden of proof.
Each of you are individuals, and -- and we are
entitled to that individual opinion.
important.

Now I think it's

Like one of the instructions said that you don't

get hooked on to an opinion so much that just by the fact that
you're arguing makes you state it just because you're arguing
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about that fact.

But you are each individuals and you're each

entitled to an opinion in this process of coming to a verdict.
Jury, ah, Instruction No. 7 talks about the
presumption of innocence and the presum- —
it's important for you to keep that in —

ah —

and I think

in mind.

When we

come here today, when we started this thing, when you start
deliberating, he is innocent.

And you have to re- —

review

the evidence and see if the State has taken, ah -- taken it
out cf that —

the posture of being presumed innocent and it

was established that by, ah, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Now, I think this is important to look at the, ah,
jury -- the element offenses that are found in 10 and 11, and
look at those closely.

I'm only gonna go through, ah --

basically go through Instruction No. 10, because I think
that's the more serious offense and I think it!s important to
look at those things.
Ah did the defendant act knowingly and
intentionally?

I think you need to look at that and see

whether there!s any evidence to establish that beyond a
reasonable doubt.
you, each —

Because like Mr. Garrett has indicated to

each one of these elements -- every —

every

aspect of these elements have to be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Are you convinced, beyond a reasonable

doubt, the defendant acted knowingly and intentionally?
The second element as to that said "Did the
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
PAGE

166

defendant possess controlled substance meth?"
it?

Did he possess

Is there any proof that establishes beyond a reasonable

doubt that he knowingly and intentionally possessed meth?
Ah, and did he do that possession with the intent to
distribute?

As —

has the State presented any evidence that

indicated that Mr. Sherry intended to distribute the drugs?
And did the intent to possess and distribute occur
on or about June 25

, 2004, and did it occur in Iron

County?
The same thing is true with, ah, the paraphernalia.
Ah, was there paraphernalia there that meets the elements, ah,
going through those elements as I have.

Because if you

remember, each of those elements have to be established beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Was there intent to distribute?

there intent to possess?
distribute on June 25

Was

Was there intent to possess and
in Iron County?

You have to go

through each one of those elements to come to a determination
of whether or not the State has met its burden.
Jury Instruction No. 13 talks about showing a
connection.

Itrs a constructive, ah, possession.

Jury

instruction shows that the State has the burden of
establishing a connection between the drugs and the attempt to
distribute and this defendant.

I think it!s important that

you keep that in mind when you are talking about this.
I do want to talk a little bit about expert, because
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there was some expert testimony that was presented.

And, ah,

I!m gonna get into a little bit about fingerprints.

But it's

my opinion that, ah, the expert opinion doesn't really add any
significance to your deliberation, because if you recall, this
expert -- the same person that's offering this expert opinion
is also the one that said, "Well, he was guilty.
—

you know, "We found the drugs in his truck.

And didn't do anything else to find anything.

We found — "

He's guilty."
So I —

I think

the fact that he branded, ah, Mr. Sherry guilty, before doin1
any sort of analysis, before doin' any sort of tests on the -on the drugs, before -- without doing any fingerprint
analysis, any of that type of stuff, he branded him guilty.
And so I think any expert opinion, in regards to that is —
and if you look at the instructions, I think those are the
very factors that you need to weigh in determining whethe~r or
not you give this expert any weight in —

in the opinion.

So I don't think the fact that he gave —

any expert

shouLd play any part in your deliberations, because he -- he
found —

he found him guilty when he found him in the truck

with the drug -- or the drugs in the same truck that he was
driving.

And I don't think that was a fair assessment.
Let's -- now keeping those facts in mind, let's go a

little -- or keeping that law in mind, let's go over a little
bit of the facts.

I think the history of the vehicle -- of

the vehicle is important in determining whether or not the
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State's met its burden.

If we remember, ah, there was —

there was a time when, ah, Mr. Sherry purchased the vehicle.
I don't think that's -- that's not disputed.
in his name, obviously.

It's never put

But I don't think we're disputing or

there's been any dispute to the fact that he owned the
vehicle.
However, it hadn't been licensed.

It hadn't had any

insurance since 1999. And you heard the testimony that was
presented by, ah, Scott.
years.

It was a —

wasn't running.

It hadn't ran.

basically, ah, a vacated vehicle that

And it only ran for a —

the stop was made.

It hadn't ran for

a few hours before

It sat, ah, somewhere for a period —

a long period of time.

for

It hadn't been functioning since 1999.

I think that's a fair assumption to make.

And for at least a

period of time, it was in the parking lot, ah, in —
Agrinautics parking lot.
There was no door key to it.
lock the vehicle up.
ignition key.

Ah, all —

There was no way to

all that they had was an

This was a 1980 something.

the testimony was of the vehicle.
it was an older pickup.

I don't know what

A Chevy pickup.

Ah, needed a lot of work.

So it —
And I

think around town we've seen these vehicles parked all over
the place.
a —

And you know —

I think in your own mind you have

a -- a memory of that type of vehicle and the type of

situation.
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As we get closer to the time period of when this
happened, ah, they worked on it for a period of time.
Changed -- took the engine out over in the parking lot. And
that took about a two-week process.

And then just the night

before, they brought it over, put the new engine in.
morning they had to make some more repairs to it.
the carburetor.

Get the breaks workin'.

The next

Fine tune

And then he drove

it.

And within a very short period of time, ah, he was picked

up.

So we went from a vehicle that was not running, it was

not functioning, to, ah -- to the stop.

So there's not a lot

of period of time that was in Mr., ah, Sherry's control. And
I don't think you can come to the conclusion it was ever in
his exclusive control.
And I think that's where Jury Instruction No. 9
comes in play.

And I want to spend a little bit more time

with Instruction No. 9.
first paragraph of that:

In fact, I'm gonna read verbatim
"If the evidence in this case is

susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of
which appears to you to be reasonable and one of which points
to the guilt of the defendant while the other points to his
innocence, it is your duty under the law to adopt that
interpretation which will admit to the defendant's innocence
and reject that which points to his guilt."
And that's part of the reasonable doubt Jury
Instruction.

Is there a reasonable doubt?

If there's another
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reasonable explanation of the facts, you have to expect —
accept that reasonable explanation and find the —

find that

the State has not met its burden of proof.
Now, maybe you!d point well, we think it probably
happened this way, but we could see how it may happened this
other way.

To me that's reasonable doubt.

balancing thing.

Okay, we're gonna —

So it!s not a

this one weighs more

this more, so we're gonna go with this one (Indicated).
not that.

It's the question is is there reasonable doubt?
Now there's only —

two -- two interpretations.
didn't know about it.
choices.

It's

I guess it can boil down to
One, he knew about it, or he

I mean that's —

There's no other options.

that's the two

He either knew about it

being there or he didn't know about it.
And the question —

I think the question or way to

analyze that is is there any evidence that establishes that he
knew about that in there?

And perhaps maybe —

maybe a way to

look at it would be, ah, cause it's only very difficult to
prove the negative.

I mean, for example, if, ah -- if we went

out into, ah, the parking lot or you just went and bought a
brand new car and somebody looked inside this —

this

compartment that's behind the door panel and found some drugs,
how would you be able to prove that you didn't put it there?
You just barely picked up the car.

You —

you maybe bought it

last week, but it's been having some repair, and you — and
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you just go and pick it up.

How do you prove that you didn't

put those drugs there?
Well, I think the very first thing a person would
say is, "Check it for fingerprints.
fingerprints aren't on there."
That would sew it up.
testimony was the —

You're gonna find out my

And that's a normal reaction.

If you checked that the —

and the

the surfaces, you could find

fingerprints.
The scales.
to fingerprints.

That was a surface that is susceptible

The baggies, those are surfaces that are

susceptible to fingerprints.

So all they would have had to

have done to eliminate the possibility that Bob didn't know
about it is just see if his fingerprints are on it, because
how could he say, "I didn't know about it?"

How could any

person, when something is discovered in there, ah, dispute the
fact that there's fingerprints on there?

So that would have

been an easy way to completely get rid of that reasonable
interpretation of the facts.
Another would - - way would be to show that that's —
that person had exclusive control of that area.

If —

if it

was established that Bob was the only person that had access
to that cubbyhole, ah, where the drugs were found, then -then —

then they would be reasonable to say he didn't know

about it.

But there hasn't been any proof that he had

exclusive control of it.
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It was in the parking lot forever.
lock.

It wouldn't

It was in this shop being repaired forever with workers

comin' and going.
of that area.

So Mr. Sherry has not had exclusive control

There's lots of people who had control of that

area.
And when we talked about the value of this —
drugs, ah, I mean why would a person, ah —
both ways.

these

I mean that goes

Why would a person carry that much drugs around or

that much money around and not be able to lock it up?
not in distribution form.
little bags.

It's

I mean it's not already in the

There's no indication that it was being put into

little bags or that he was going to distribute.

So why would

you carry it in a vehicle that you can't even lock up?
doesn't make sense either.

That

Or at least it raises to the level

of reasonable doubt.
So the value of the drugs, it doesn't prove one way
or another, or it doesn't conclusively show either way as to
whether or not he had knowledge of it being in there.
Ah, where it was located doesn't tell us whether he
knew.

It was back behind there.

Ah, the officer, ah,

testified that there's no way you could have seen —

just by

looking at that hole in the panel, would you have seen the
bag?

You had to reach in before you —

you could find it.

Well, who's gonna reach inside a cubbyhole?

How many times

have you got in a car that didn't did have a speaker thing and
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you reached in there to see if there was anything back there?
Nobody does that.

It could be —

it could have been there for

a long period of time before somebody had reached back there.
Maybe until somebody got arrested and the -- and the vehicle
was searched.
It might have been the only time that somebody would
have reached in there.

Or a time to change the speakers or

put speakers in there.
Ah, and the fingerprints, to me, is a big issue.
That's -- thatTs the thing that could have shown guilt or
innocence.

It could go both ways.

fingerprints on it.

It could have shown Bob's

Then it would be very difficult, if not

impossible, to then say, "Well, I didnft —
my fingerprints got there.

I don't know how

But they're there and I —

I had

no knowledge of it."
It may have been able to establish that maybe
somebody else that had access to the vehicle's fingerprints on
it and then, ah —

and then that —

that we could have pursued

that angle to see if that person had control or could exercise
control over the vehicle.

But when you have a situation like

we have here when Bob is not the only one that —

that the

State has not established in any manner exclusive control in
Bob's —

in Bob's favor against Bob, and the fact that we

don't have any fingerprints to prove or establish that he
touched this or ever had control of it, I don't think the
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State has met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that he's guilty of what theyfve charged him with.
So for this reason, I think as you go through each
of the elements that we went through before, you're gonna find
that the State has not met its burden, that there are
questions in your mind about whether or not, ah, Bob had
exclusive control of it, and that he possessed it with the
intent to distribute it in Iron County on that date.
I also -- and I remind you again that, ah, Mr.
Garrett's gonna be able to counter some of the things. I
invite you to please say, "What would —

what would Mr.

Slavens1 response be to that counterpoint?"

And then come to

your conclusion as you go and deliberate.
Again, I appreciate your time and your efforts in
this matter.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Slavens.

Mr. Garrett,

you're final remarks.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.

PLAINTIFF'S FINAL CLOSING ARGUMENT
BY MR. GARRETT:

One of the jury instructions, ah,

directs you to not consider the possible penalty.

Mr. Slavens

indicated that Instruction 10 has a more severe penalty than
Instruction 11.

In other words, the Unlawful Possession Of

Meth With Intent To Distribute is more severe penalty than
would be Possession Of Drug Paraphernalia.
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It's your job and

instruction is you're not to consider the possible penalty.
You're to apply the facts to the law and —
MR, SLAVENS:

Your Honor, Ifm gonna have to take

exception to that, cause I think what I said was it was a more
serious charge.

I didn't say anything about penalties.

THE COURT:

Sustained.

But that is what you said.

But I don't know that that changes the argument.
MR. GARRETT:

Yes. A more serious charge.

THE COURT: Correct.
MR. GARRETT:
If —

Ah, but you're not to consider it.

if you find that the State has met its elements as

outlined in Instruction 10, then, ah, you're to convict,
regardless of the penalty.

Okay?

Ah, constructive possession.

There's a —

there's a

difference between constructive possession and actual
possession.

Let me give you an example.

If two people are —

are Ln a vehicle and they're driving down the road and they're
stopped, the car is stopped, ah, and there's drugs in the
vehicle, okay?
driver.

Ah, it may be that they -- they belong to the

Okay?
The question is did the passenger also

constructively possess?
they'd be possessed them.

They may not be his drugs. But
Did he have -- did he have the

intent to, ah, to possess them?
Were they within reach?

The ability to possess them?

Did he have the intent to exercise
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control or dominion over the drugs?
Ah, i think itfs a case of actual possession.
constructive possession.
his.

I think he possessed them.

Not

They're

They're nobody else's.
We are not saying that they belong to somebody else,

but he may have had the intent to exercise control or dominion
over them.

We're saying that -- that they're his drugs and

that he posted them -- he actually posted them.

Not

constructively.
Ah, Mr. Slavens talked about, ah, Commander
Millett's testimony as an expert and how you should disregard
that because he had him pegged guilty from the start. Well,
I'd remind you that this actually is Agent Gower's case. He's
the one take arrested the defendant.

Captain Millett came in

after and looked at the evidence and made some conclusions,
based upon his training and experience.
didn't actually make the arrest.

But he didn't — he

And this wasn't his — his

investigative case.
He reviewed the evidence and made some conclusions
in expert today, which I think were very helpful.

One thing

that he talked about was the evidence, ah, being fresh. And
you've heard more testimony from Agent Gower about how there
wasn't any dust on the evidence -- on the bag.

He talked

about that, suggesting that it had been taken in and out.
MR. SLAVENS:

Your Honor, this is —
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I object to

this as not being rebuttal, and I think it's also saying
testimony that's not in evidence.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

MR. GARRETT:

So, you know, if —

if the defense is

that the drugs were there when he bought the vehicle, I think
that that's not reasonable, given the condition of the bag,
the fact that there wasn't any dust, rust, or other dirt or
items on the bag.

I think it —

it had been placed there

recently and had been used and taken in and out.
Ah, there was some testimony about there not being
a —

a key to open the truck.

testimony to be credible.

You may or may not find that

But even —

credible and there wasn't a key.

let's assume that it is

I think that's the reason

why the drugs are hidden in the secret compartment, you know,
so they're not out open to the public view.

So if somebody

walks by, they don't see the $5,000 or equivalent of $5,000
sitting on the —

in the cab of the vehicle.

Nice little

place to hide the drugs right there (Indicated).
And Instruction No. 9 talks about —
you.

he read this to

It talks about if there's two reasonable constructions,

then you're to adopt the one that allows his innocence and
reject the other.

Well, I don't think there's two reasonable

constructions here.

I've only heard one.

don't give you evidence.
evidence.

Like I told you, I

Mr. Slavens doesn't give you

The evidence comes from the witnesses.
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The

evidence was that we found drugs in the defendant's vehicle
and that it was his vehicle.
What evidence did you get, other than that, to
suggest that the drugs weren't his?
Ah, there was no —

no evidence put before you.

The witness that testified for the defense, he
didn't —

did he give you anything?
MR. SLAVENS:

Your Honor, I'm gonna object to this

because it's attempting to shift the burden, and the burden
never shifts to the defendant to produce any evidence.
THE COURT:

I disagree with that comment and I will

overrule the objection.

However, I will instruct the jury

that the burden always remains with the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Before any

conviction occurs, the defendant never has the responsibility
to prove his innocence.
Go ahead with your argument.
MR. GARRETT:

Thank you.

Well the argument was is I don't see two stories
before you.
that —

I think if there had been some evidence presented

that somebody else had left the drugs in the vehicle,

then you might have another —

you might have a defense.

might have another story to consider.

You

But the evidence that

you have before you is the drugs were found in his vehicle.
He was driving the vehicle.

That's it.
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There was nothing

else for you to consider.

And so I don't think there is two

reasonable constructions.

I think there's one.

Fingerprints.
briefly.

I just want to touch on that again

Do you think we wouldn't be here?

Let's assume, for

argument's sake, that they had found some fingerprints on this
evidence.

Do you think we wouldn't be here today?

Or might

we be here and might the defense be yeah, "Well, yeah, his
fingerprints on there.

Ah, but those -- those weren't his.

They were his buddies, you know."

Or "Yeah, he -- he may have

had this in his house and touched this scale.

But he — he

didn't have it together with the drugs, and the drugs weren't
his."

Would that be where we're at?
I submit that we'd till be here today.

Even if we

had a fingerprint, the arguments of the defense might be
"These were changed."

It might be a little different.

But I

think we'd still be here.
Ah, he made a statement that nobody reaches into a
cubbyhole.

Ah, again, it's a great place to hide the drugs,

if you want to keep it out of sight.

Especially if you're —

you know, if you're gonna get pulled over by a police officer.
Ah, you know, you hope that he comes up next to the window to
talk to you and he's not gonna see it from that vantage point
(Indicated).
Sometimes juries get —

they get caught up in, ah,

suppression issues and things like that when they get back to
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deliberate.

I just want to tell you that —

that those

issues, ah, have already been resolved in this case.

In other

words, -MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

Now this is —

Sustained.

thatTs inappropriate.

That is inappropriate.

There!s no evidence in the record regarding that the jury can
consider.
MR. GARRETT:

Okay.

My point is that when you get

back to deliberate, ah, you're not to consider search and
seizure issues or whether or not the search was lawful that
was performed by Detective Gower.

That your law, as itrs

contained in those instructions, 1 through 24, that's where
you're to find your law and your instructions.

And anything

outside of that, ah, is not to be considered by —
jury, together in your deliberations.

by the

That is where your law

is contained.
And so if you have questions about anything, you
know, regarding this case, as far as the law goes, you'll
refer to your jury instruction and there you'll find the
answers.
Ah, I appreciate your —

your attendance, ah, here

today, the way that you listened to the facts.

Ah, I -- I

hope that, ah, you'll go back and then you'll take the time to
read through the Instructions, ah, apply the law to the facts
as you've heard 'em, consider the evidence.
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And when you're

done, I hope you return a —

or your -- excuse me -- a verdict

of guilty, because he did possess methamphetamine.

The

defendant possessed Methamphetamine with the intent to
distribute the same (Indicated).

And he also possessed drug

paraphernalia in the form of the scales and the baggies
(Indicated).
Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Garrett.

I!ll ask the Bailiff to take the oath to take charge
of the jury.
CLERK:

Do you solemnly swear that you will take

charge of this jury and keep them together in the Jury Room,
that you will not allow any person to communicate with them
during the course of their deliberations nor communicate with
them yourself, except to inquire as to whether they've agreed
upon a verdict, that you will not communicate to any person
the state of their deliberations nor the verdict agreed upon,
and that you will return them to the courtroom when directed
by the Court, so help you God.
BAILIFF:
THE COURT:

Yes, mam.
All right.

Ladies and gentlemen, the time has come for you to
begin your deliberations.

That means you're now free to

discuss the case among yourselves.
You'll take with you, into the Jury Room, the Jury
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiff,
CASE NO.
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ROBERT JAMES SHERRY,

041500345

Defendant.
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It is my duty now to begin instructing you concerning the law applicable in this case,
and it is your duty as jurors to apply the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are raised by the charges in the
Information filed by the State of Utah and the defendant's plea of "Not Guilty" to those
charges. You should perform that duty uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion
or prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be biased against the defendant
because of the fact that he has been arrested or because an Information has been filed against
him or because he has been brought before the Court to stand trial. None of these facts is
evidence of his guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of
them that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2
You are to be governed in this case by the evidence presented to you and the law as I
state it to you. You may not consider mere sentiment, guesswork, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling in deciding the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. Both the State of Utah and the defendant have a right to expect that you, and
each of you, will conscientiously, seriously and impartially consider and weigh the evidence
and properly apply the law to reach a just verdict, regardless of what the consequences of
that verdict maybe.
The verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror.

INSTRUCTION NO. 3

You are the exclusive judges of the facts, and the effect, value and weight of the
evidence produced in this case. You may consider any evidence which is admitted by me.
You may not consider evidence which is excluded or which is admitted and later ordered by
me to be stricken. Likewise, you may not consider as evidence statements of the attorneys,
or any hint or intimation of the truth or falsity of any fact or evidence made by the attorneys.
Statements, arguments and remarks of the attorneys are intended to help you
understand the evidence and apply the law, but such statements are not evidence. You
should disregard any statement of an attorney which has no basis in the evidence coming
from witnesses, documents or stipulations received in evidence in this case.
Of course, if the attorneys stipulate to any fact or facts and that stipulation is accepted
by me, you may regard the stipulated fact or facts as conclusively proven and shown without
additional evidence.
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Instructions, and you may each take your copy, ah, as well as
the evidence that's been received as exhibits here and the
verdict form.

Would you follow the Bailiff into the jury

room.
(Jury left courtroom.)
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED OUTSIDE PRESENCE OF JURY
THE COURT:
door is closed.

The jury has now left the room.

We 1 11 be in recess until

The

—

DEFENSE MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
BY MR. SLAVENS:

Your Honor, I!d like to make a

motion.
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

MR. SLAVENS:
well.

You know, I know Mr. Garrett very

I think he's —

he's a good man, an honorable man.

But

I am just shocked that he would tell the jury that the
discretion areas -- issues have already been taken —
care of.
to a jury.

taken

I have no idea why he would say something like that
I think that's prosecutorial misconduct to say

that.

I don't think there's any legitimate reason to say

that.

It has nothing to do with any defense that we presented

and does nothing more than try and tell the jury that there's
evidence out there that he wasn't able to present.
THE COURT:

And so what's your motion?

MR. SLAVENS:

Well, I think the charges should be

dismissed because of it, and at the very least, a mistrial.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SLAVENS: Well, yes.

3

THE COURT:

4
5

You're moving for a mistrial.

On the basis of prosecutorial

misconduct,
MR. SLAVENS:

Yes.

I think -- I don't know what the

6

law is, as far as, ah, what happens after the jury has been

7

impaneled and read the Jury Instructions, whether or not

8

double jeopardy forbids further —

9
10
11

THE COURT:

Well jeopardy attaches when they were

sworn this morning at the beginning of the proceedings.
MR. SLAVENS:

Yes.

So I don't know whether what I'm

12

asking for is a mistrial or that it can't be further

13

prosecuted because of double jeopardy.

14

that's a way.

15

that determination.

16

tainted because of that statement.

17
18
19

And I —

THE COURT:

But I —

I think

I need further research to come to

But I think that this jury has been

Now tell me what the prejudice is to

your client.
MR. SLAVENS:

Well, he -- he said to —

he said to

20

the jury that, ah, the suppression issues have already been

21

taken care of.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. SLAVENS: Well, the fact there was nothing

24
25

Which is true.

suppressed in this case.
THE COURT:

Oh, yes there was.
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MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

In th.Ls case?
Yes.

MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

What.
Isn't this the one where we suppressed

what was found in his house?
MR. SLAVENS:

Yeah.

But that1 s a whole —

those are

whole\ different chargess, but nothing to <do with the issues
But what ! s

regai ding the;se chargeis.

—

You 1 re saying that I didn't suppress the

THE COURT:

evide nee found in the car.
MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

Right
Was the:re a motion to suppress them?

MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

Yes.
I ruled on it?

that regard have been taken care of.
MR. SLAVENS:

Well, okay.

it would be a true statement.

The issues :Ln that -- in
So it is true.
That —

But what —

that —

I guess

what's the purpose

of haiving a sijppression heariiig if we te 11 the jury,, "Well,
therei were suppression issues ," and they don ! t kn<DW that there
wasn' t anythiing suppressed.
THE COURT:
I

— I instru cted —

Well, I sustained your objec3tion.

I, ah, o rdered that he not continue with

that line of <questioning.
prejudiced by that?

And

My question is how are you

It is a -true statement.

MR. SLAVENS:

Because I -- as you know, from the

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

1

other case, we can't go into inquire as to what they1re

2

deliberating.

3

THE COURT:

Um-hm.

4

MR. SLAVENS:

Now they start deliberating, we can

5

never use any deliberation in there.

6

statement out there that the discretion issues have already

7

been taken up.

8

suppressed.

9

possibility that they're in there saying, "Well dang. We

10

And so we have this

They don't know that there was no evidence

So if they —

so they —

they -- there's a

don't -- we didn't even get all the evidence."

11

THE COURT:

Okay.

Do you have any authority that

12

supports the position that mentioning the fact that there was

13

a suppression issue that —

14

MR. GARRETT:

Judge —

Judge, I didn't mention there

15

was a suppression hearing.

16

and they worry about searches, referring to the search of the

17

vehicle.

18
19
20
21

I said sometimes juries get back

I said that -THE COURT:

You did make the statement that the

suppression issues had been taken care of already.
MR. GARRETT:

Any suppression issues would have been

taken care of at this point —

22

THE COURT: Yeah.

23

MR. GARRETT:

—

and that you're not to consider —

24

what I didn't want them to do, goin' back there and saying,

25

Hey, he searched the vehicle," you know, "why did he search
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it?"

That's the purpose of —
THE COURT:

of me saying what I said.

Do you realize that you were presenting

evidence to the jury that hasn't been presented?
MR. GARRETT:

Well, he presented evidence to the

jury that hadn't been presented.
THE COURT:

Which was?

MR. GARRETT:
THE COURT:

No.

I'm not making a motion.

Ha-ha ha.

MR. GARRETT:

Are you making a motion.

Okay.

All right.

I'm not just saying that.

I just

didn't want them to get back in there and say that Tony
Gower's search was illegal and therefore —

you know, those

things —
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. GARRETT:
THE COURT:

They have.

MR. SLAVENS:
THE COURT:

They've been instructed on the law.

And I think that would —

But right now back to my question.

Do

you have any legal authority to support your motion for a
mistrial?
MR. SLAVENS:

Well, other than I —

I don't think

there's any dispute that it's improper to tell, ah, the jury
about any suppression hearing, about exercising the right to
remain silent or any of those things —
THE COURT:
the issue here.

Well, but you —

anything —
let's talk about just

Where is there any case law that says that
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1

celling them that there!s been a suppression issue dealt with

2

is prosecutorial misconduct rising to the level that requires

3

a mistrial?

Have you got any authority to that effect?

4

MR. SLAVENS:

5

THE COURT:

I —

I haven't researched it,

I know there's authority on the question

6

of whether you comment on the defendant's right to remain

7

silent.

8
9
10

That clearly constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
MR. SLAVENS:

that's the only —

Well, I think that's —

yean. And

that's the only case law I know of. And I

think by, you know, analyzing it, I think is the same thing.

11

THE COURT:

12

Now, Mr. Garrett, do you want to respond on the

13

Okay.

subject of any legal authority?

14

MR. GARRETT:

Well, I'm not aware of any legal

15

authority, Your Honor.

16

where juries go back there and then they want to —

17

to talk about search and seizure.

18

that's not —

19

in the Jury Instructions.

20

have been resolved at this point.

21

intent and my purpose of making that statement.

A, like I said, I've seen it before
they want

I'm merely stating that

that's inappropriate at this point.

Your law is

Any issues regarding that would
And that -- that was my

22

THE COURT:

23

Do you have any final remarks on the subject?

24

MR. SLAVENS:

25

All right.

Well, yeah.

I —

I question that

because there wasn't any evidence or argument or anything
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questioning the search to the jury.

And I —

I've done a lot

of jury trials and Ifve never seen a jury go back there and
try and deliberate -- you know, deliberate whether or not the
search was legal or not.

I mean that —

that just —

Ifm just

completely confounded why, ah, the prosecutor would say that.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SLAVENS:

I think the only —

the only — the

only reason I could see is to get them to thinking that there
might have been some evidence that they weren't able to hear.
THE COURT:

Well, all right.

I didn't hear anything in the comment that would
have inferred to the jury that there was other evidence that
they weren't told about.

Ah, so I don't view that as the

purpose of the statement.

On the other hand.

I don't think

that's appropriate for the prosecutor for tell the jury about
prior proceedings that aren't in the —
evidence.

aren't in the

Ah, so I find that I think that it was

inappropriate to make that comment that those issues had
already been dealt with.

On the other hand, I don't think it

rises to the level that requires a mistrial, so I'm gonna deny
the motion for a mistrial.
Anything else we need to deal with at that point?
MR. GARRETT:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

We'll be in recess until the jury has

reached a verdict or until further order of the Court.
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